[afnog] survey on BGP prefix hijacking

[Pavlos Sermpezis]

[apologies for cross-posting]

Dear AFNOG Community,

BGP prefix hijacking remains a problem for Internet routing, despite the 
(partial) use of RPKI or detection services.  We would like to hear your 
opinions on BGP prefix hijacking (concerns, existing defenses, needs, 
etc.) that would help us research new defense mechanisms both for its 
detection and mitigation.

Please help us by answering this short (< 10min, 21 questions) and 
anonymous survey.

Survey URL: http://tinyurl.com/hijack-survey


*** The survey ***

This survey is part of a joint research effort by CAIDA (www.caida.org) 
and the ICS-FORTH (www.ics.forth.gr) research institute, to study (a) 
operator awareness of BGP prefix hijacking attacks/incidents, (b) 
presently used defenses against BGP prefix hijacking, (c) the 
willingness to adopt new defense mechanisms, and (d) reasons that may 
hinder the deployment of BGP prefix hijacking defenses.

We expect the findings of this survey to increase the understanding of 
existing BGP hijacking defenses and the needs of network operators, as 
well as help us design and implement new defense mechanisms that we will 
present to the operator and scientific communities.

A summary of the aggregate results will be published as a part of an 
article/conference paper.


Thank you in advance, and we look forward to your responses!

Alberto (CAIDA) and Pavlos (ICS-FORTH)



-- 
Pavlos Sermpezis,
Postdoctoral Researcher
https://sites.google.com/site/pavlossermpezis/

INSPIRE group (http://www.inspire.edu.gr/)
Telecommunications and Networks Laboratory (TNL)
ICS, FORTH, Greece